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Auction based vehicle resource allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental
LIU Xudong, ZHANG Xuejie, ZHANG Jixian, LI Weidong, ZHANG Jing
Journal of Computer Applications    2018, 38 (8): 2423-2430.   DOI: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2018010234
Abstract628)      PDF (1309KB)(412)       Save
Since the vehicles provided by current online car rental platforms are in the fixed price, there are some issues coming up such as unreasonable allocation of the vehicle resources, unreliable price that could not indicates the real market supply and demand timely, and generally low social welfare. Therefore, an auction based vehicle allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental was proposed. Firstly, a mathematical model and a social welfare maximization objective function were established by studying the model of online car rental issues. Secondly, based on the minimum cost and maximum flow algorithm, the optimal vehicle resource allocation algorithm was adopted among the rental vehicle allocation algorithms. Finally, in terms of the price calculation algorithms, a truthful VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) price algorithm was used to calculate the final price. As a result, compared with the traditional first-come-first-serving algorithms, the order success rate of the proposed scheme was increased by 20% to 30%, and the revenue was increased by about 30%. Theoretical analysis and experiment results show that the proposed mechanism has the advantages of optimizing vehicle allocation and flexible price strategy.
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